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1. Statistical Appendix 
Appendix S1: Examining the role of state capacity 
Choice of state capacity indicator 
To evaluate whether the relationships between tariff changes and health expenditure depend on 
a country’s state capacity we use the government effectiveness (GE) component of the World 
Government Indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2011). We use the GE as it is the 
most widely available proxy of the elements of state capacity that are of theoretical interest here. 
In particular, we aim to capture aspects of a state’s bureaucracy and administration that influence 
the state’s ability to effectively define, enforce, and administer non-trade taxes. This depends on 
whether states can reach their populations, collect and manage information, possess trustworthy 
agents to manage the revenue, and can ensure policies area adequately adhered to (Besley, 1995; 
Hanson and Sigman, 2013). These abilities are present where state bureaucracies are staffed by a 
well-trained civil service that are able to clearly formulate and credibly commit to a policy, 
effectively collect and administer reforms, distribute clearly formulated guidelines, and monitor 
compliance (Pomeranz and Vila-Belda, 2019).  
There are additional dimensions of a state capacities that are not captured in the GE index and 
could also influence a government’s ability to collect and administer tax revenue. For example, to 
achieve policy goals, including the collection of revenue, a state may need a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of the military within its territory and possess the force necessary to contain 
threats throughout its territory – or at least convince its rivals that this is the case (Besley and 
Persson, 2013). While these ‘coercive’ state capacities are not the only way to maintain order and 
evoke compliance from the population, they have historically represented a key aspect of the 
ability of states to survive and implement policies (Ardant, 1971). However, we proxy the 
bureaucratic and administrative aspects a state’s capacity – rather than its ability to use force – as 
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examining the former can provide insights into what are arguably the most politically acceptable 
and actionable means of improving tax administration.  
We also considered a number of alternative indicators of state capacity. One alternative is the 
International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) Bureaucratic Quality rating. However, this is a 
comparatively narrow indicator of the quality of bureaucracy compared with the GE index as it 
measures fewer relevant components. Previous studies have also observed that the ICRG 
measure is more prone to measurement errors compared with the GE index due to analyst 
perceptions of economic or social outcomes, rather than bureaucratic quality per se (Rauch and 
Evans, 2000; Hendrix, 2010). In contrast, Arndt and Oman (2006) pointed out that the WGIs – 
including the GE index –  are “probably the most carefully constructed indicators” (Arndt, 
2006).  
Another possible set of proxies for state capacity are the ‘Varieties of Democracy’, or ‘V-Dem’, 
measures. These are designed to capture whether electoral competition exists, whether elections 
are free and fair, and to what extent political and civic organizations can operate unrestrained 
(Lindberg et al., 2014). Higher scores on the V-Dem index capture the presence of a well-
functioning democracy. Democratic institutions may foster state capacity; for example, the 
process of carrying out elections may promote an expanded and deepened presence of the state 
over the national territory (Carbone and Memoli, 2015). The possible causal link between 
democratic institutions and state capacity suggests that indicators of democracy that are included 
in the V-Dem index may serve as suitable proxies for state capacity.  
Yet, the very plausibility of a causal link between these two state characteristics also illustrates 
that they can (and arguably should) be seen as distinct concepts. Democratisation concerns the 
extent to which potentially unfettered political power is contestable and subject to checks and 
balances. That is what the V-Dem index is designed to measure, and relevant sub-indices are 
chosen on that basis. In contrast, state capacities concern the technical and administrative ability 
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of a government to construct and implement policies throughout a territory (Andersen, Møller 
and Skaaning, 2014).  Hence, we did not use the V-Dem index as it captures aspects of a state’s 
politics or governance that were distinct from my theoretical interests specifically in state 
capacities that influence domestic tax administration. 
Another possible set of measures are the Quality of Government (QoG) indicators. The measure 
may seem related to aspects of state capacity, particularly where it captures competition over civil 
service appointments (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008; Teorell, 2016). However, documents 
describing the QoG indicators and codebook note that this indicator is primarily concerned with 
“the impartiality of institutions that exercise government authority” (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008; 
Teorell et al., 2016). This is again distinct from state capacity, which concerns the ability to design 
and implement policies throughout a territory, rather than the extent to which this process is free 
from political interference (Andersen, Møller and Skaaning, 2014). Although the civil service 
recruitment is relevant to state capacity as government staff appointed via political processes may 
not be appropriately trained in order to effectively implement policy (Xu, 2018), the degree of 
impartiality of recruitment is not synonymous with these capacities. Indeed, staff selected by 
politicians can occasionally be effective in carrying out government decisions and implementing 
policy. This is because their closer and more amicable relationships with politicians can help 
create political stability and reduce disagreement (Arriola, 2009; Grindle, 2012). 
Models 
To statistically assess the role of state capacity we re-estimate the models specified in Equation 1 
in the main paper with an additional interaction term to assess variation according to a country’s 
GE score. We estimate Equation 2 below and then compute marginal effects using the margins 
command in R (Leeper, 2017). This calculates the Average Marginal Effect of a 1% tariff 
reduction on public health expenditure at a range of specified GE scores:  
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Equation 2. HXPit = β0 + β1Tit + β2GEit + β3TitxGEit +β4Xit + αi +ϒt + εit 
Here the variable GEit is country i’s score on the GE index in year t and TitxGEit is an interaction 
of the GE score and a country’s tariff rate. All other variables and coefficients are per Equation: 
the outcome variable, HXPit, is health spending (either public or private, per capita or % GDP) 
in country i in year t. Tit is the weighted average tariff rate. β0 is the intercept and αi  in Equation 1 
is a vector of country fixed-effects which account for time-invariant, unmeasurable 
characteristics which may influence a country’s tariff rate and health expenditure. We also 
incorporate year fixed effects, ϒt, to control for common external shocks affecting tariff policies 
and health spending across all countries. Xit is a vector of time-varying controls with coefficients 
in the vector β2. We control for GDP per capita, overseas development assistance (ODA), and 
the occurrence of war (see main text for rationale for these covariates). In robustness checks we 
incorporate additional possible predictors and covariates (see Appendix S3). εit is the error term. 
Robust standard errors were clustered by country.   
 p.6 
Appendix S2: Mediation analysis 
We used a Sobel test and Baron and Kenny’s four-step procedure to examine whether any 
heterogeneous associations between tariffs and health expenditure according to a country’s GE 
score could be explained by corresponding differences in government tax revenues (Baron and 
Kenny, 1986). The steps are as follows: 
Step 1: Test for an association between the explanatory variable, the tariff rate, and the 
outcome variable, public health expenditure, and test whether this association varies 
according to a country’s GE score. 
Step 2. Test for an association between the explanatory variable, the tariff rate, and the 
potential mediator, per capita tax revenue, and test whether this association varies 
according to a country’s GE score. 
Step 3. Test for an association between the potential mediator, per capita tax revenue, 
and the outcome variable, public health expenditure. 
Step 4. Test for an association per Step 1 (between the explanatory variable, the tariff 
rate, the outcome variable, public health expenditure, and whether this association varies 
according to a country’s GE score) whilst also controlling for the potential mediator. 
 
The goal of the first three steps is to establish whether relationships between the explanatory 
variable, outcome variable, and mediator actually exist. The logic of these steps is that it would 
be difficult to claim that the observed associations between were mediated by differences in tax 
revenue and corresponding GE scores if any of these relationships were insignificant. In step 4, 
if the tariff rate variable is attenuated or no longer significant when tax revenue is controlled, the 
finding supports partial or full mediation via tax revenue.  
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The main results of the paper confirm Step 1, i.e. there is a statistically significant association 
between the treatment (tariff x GE scores interaction) and outcome (public health expenditure). 
Panel A in Figure S5 visualises the results from Step 2. We find that every 1% reduction in tariffs 
is associated with a reduction in per capita tax revenue among countries with a GE score below 
the 10th percentile (Average Marginal Effect of a 1% tariff reduction, AMEtariff = $-10.7; 95% CI: 
-20.3 to -0.95), no change in tax revenue among countries with scores in the 10th-30th percentile 
(AMEtariff = $-3.23; 95% CI: -10.6 to 4.15), and a rise in tax revenue among countries with scores 
above the 30th percentile (AMEtariff = 12.1; 95% CI: 5.08 to 19.21). 
In Step 3 we further find that every $1 increase in per capita government tax revenue was 
associated with a $0.1 (95% CI: 0.08 to 0.13) increase in per capita government spending on 
health after adjusting for possible covariates. Panel B in Figure S5 visualises the results from Step 
4. In this model the tariff x government effectiveness interaction was substantially attenuated 
and no longer statistically significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% significance thresholds. Taken 
together, these results suggest partial or full mediation via tax revenue. 
We also conducted a Sobel test to  determine whether there is a statistically significant effect of 
the Tariff x GE score variable on government health spending as mediated through tax revenues 
(Mustillo, Lizardo and McVeigh, 2018).  The result of this test rejects the null hypothesis of no 
mediation (z = -2.47, p = 0.007), suggesting that tax revenues at least partially mediate the 
relationships between tariffs, GE scores, and government health spending.  
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Appendix S3: Additional analyses 
We conducted a series of additional tests to evaluate the consistency of our results in alternative 
sample and model specifications. These are summarised in Figure 3 in the manuscript and 
described briefly in the accompanying text. Here we first provide details of these procedures, 
including the rationale for each robustness check. These are grouped according to the type of 
bias or modelling sensitivity that each test addresses. In the subsequent section we summarise 
the results from all tests (see also Figure 3 in the main text). Table S1 provides the data sources 
and measurement of additional variables included in these analyses. 
Non-random assignment 
First, a country’s tariff rate or ‘treatment’ level is non-randomly assigned. Our statistical models 
implicitly account for variables that predict a country’s ‘treatment’ level and might bias the 
estimated coefficients by adjusting for variables that are confounders of the treatment-outcome 
association (Morgan and Winship, 2007). However, the characteristics of countries with different 
tariff rate ‘treatment’ levels may differ in ways that undermine their validity as a counterfactual 
when estimating the tariff effect. One way of addressing this issue is to re-weight observations in 
order to reduce differences in the characteristics which predict a country’s tariff level across 
countries with different tariff rates (Abadie and Cattaneo, 2018). I therefore estimated an 
additional model that uses the non-parametric Covariate Balancing Generalised Propensity Score 
(npCBGPS) weighting procedure developed by Fong et al. (main text Figure 3, Model 1) (Fong, 
Hazlett and Imai, 2018). This uses an algorithm to search for a set of country-weights that, when 
applied to the data, minimise the correlation between tariff rate predictors and the tariff rate. 
These weights were then incorporated into the fixed-effects regression model. Figure S6 shows 
that this weighting procedure reduces the correlation between covariates and the tariff rate  




Next, we incorporated a series of additional possible predictors of public health spending as 
controls in our models (main text Figure 3, Models 2-8). In the first set of models we evaluate 
whether our results are robust when accounting for aspects of a country’s governance that may 
be correlated with government effectiveness and alternatively influence whether tariff reductions 
translate into a rise or fall in public health expenditure. This includes electoral accountability and 
other democratic indicators – which can influence demand for health expenditure – as well as 
the degree of corruption in a country, which can influence the efficacy tax collection and may 
divert resources away from health-systems (Franco, Álvarez-Dardet and Ruiz, 2004; Delavallade, 
2006). To evaluate this we estimated additional models in which we introduced controls for a 
country’s percentile in the ‘voice and accountability’ and ‘control of corruption’ sub-components 
of the World Governance Indicators, and a country’s score on the Polity regime authority 
spectrum (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr, 2002). We estimate three separate models controlling for 
each of these indicators separately in each specification (main text Figure 3, Models 2-4), as well 
as a fourth model including all three additional indicators simultaneously (main text Figure 3, 
Model 5).  
We also estimate a model in which we adjusted for demographic variables which are expected to 
be associated with higher health expenditures by increasing demand for health-care and services: 
the fertility rate and the combined share of the population aged under 15 and over 65 as they 
(main text Figure 3, Model 6) (Nooruddin and Simmons, 2009). In another model we included a 
control for the level of urbanisation, since large clusters urban dwellers can mobilize demands 
for additional health-care and services from governments, and cities also offer economies of 
scale (main text Figure 3, Model 7) (Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998; Baqir, 2002).  
It is possible that tariff changes occur in the context of international political integration – 
including Free Trade Agreement ratification or United Nations membership. These co-inciding 
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political processes may account for our results as they can influence health policy norms or 
policy space in ways that may encourage or discourage public health expenditure(Meyer et al., 
1997; Brady, Beckfield and Zhao, 2007; Barlow et al., 2018). We therefore re-estimated our 
models including a control for a country’s degree of international political integration using the 
political globalization sub-component of the KOF Globalization Index (main text Figure 3, 
Model 8).   
Finally, we conducted a test in which we exclude official development assistance from the 
models, astrade openness can encourage aid and so this variable may mediate the association and 
attenuate the bias the true tariff coefficient (main text Figure 3, Model 9) (Helble, Mann and 
Wilson, 2009; Richiardi, Bellocco and Zugna, 2013).  
Alternative tariff measures 
Our trade-weighted measure of the average tariff rate has certain limitations. For example, a 
country may have relatively little trade overall because it has prohibitive tariffs (i.e., tariffs set so 
high as to eliminate imports) in many import categories. In this case a country would have a large 
share of trade in a few import categories with relatively low tariffs. The trade-weighted average 
tariff would be relatively low in this case. This would result in a low average tariff being reported 
for a protectionist country. Alternatively, a country may apply lower tariff rates to WTO 
members, who are subject to a country’s Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) tariff, compared with 
non-WTO members. However, these tariffs may only be moderately lower than the tariffs on 
non-WTO members and so have little effect on who a country trades with. In this case, the 
weighted average tariff rate might also capture tariffs on non-WTO members, resulting in a 
slightly higher tariff rate being reported than is appropriate given the lower tariffs on WTO 
members.  
 To address the possible issues outlined above we evaluated whether our results were consistent 
when substituting our original tariff estimate for alternative tariff measures: the simple mean 
 p.11 
average tariff (main text Figure 3, Model 10) and the weighted-mean MFN tariff (main text 
Figure 3, Model 11). 
Budget cycles and observer bias 
It may take time for changes in tariffs and tax revenues to influence government budgets and 
health expenditures. For example, many governments set budgets in response to tariff and tax 
revenue changes in the previous - rather than current – year. We therefore conducted an 
additional robustness check in which we re-estimate my models with the explanatory variables 
lagged by 1-year (Figure 3, Model 12). 
 
In addition, those compiling the GE index, or the surveys used to construct it, may hold the 
view that state capacity is integral to development (Stubbs, King and Stuckler, 2014). This raises 
the possibility that observers from, or selected by, organisations that hold such a view may code 
countries that are performing better economically with higher scores on the GE index or its 
constituent indicators. Although coding bias may not be deliberate, it could still occur as a sub-
conscious result of exposure to information about country economic performance. As a result, 
we would expect GE scores to have upward bias in countries with higher GDP per capita or 
GDP growth. We therefore conducted an additional robustness test, following Stubbs et al. 
(2014), in which we control for GDP growth in the previous year when estimating my models 
(Figure 3, Model 13). 
 
Influential observations 
We evaluated the sensitivity of our results to potentially influential observations – including 
those with very high tariffs and low spending – by calculating the Cook’s distance of each unit. 
Cook’s distance (or ‘D’) is a commonly used measure of the influence exerted by each data point 
on the predicted outcome (Snijders and Berkhof, 2008; Van der Meer, Te Grotenhuis and Pelzer, 
2010). Cook’s D for each observation i measures the change in fitted values for all observations 
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with and without the presence of observation i. As a rule of thumb, cases are regarded as too 
influential if the associated value for Cook’s D exceeds the cut-off value of 4/n. We re-estimated 
our models excluding cases with a Cook’s D larger than 4/n to test whether their exclusion 
produced different findings (Figure 3, Model 14). 
 
Robustness check results 
Figure 3 in the main text shows that the results from each of the additional tests described above 
were consistent with our  original specification: a 1% reduction in tariffs was associated with an 
increase in per capita public health spending of between $3.4 (95% CI: 1.19 to 5.62) and $8.1 
(95% CI: 5.56 to 10.59) among countries with a government effectiveness score above the 30th 
percentile, no statistically identifiable change in public health care expenditure among countries 
with scores between the 10th and 30th percentile, and a reduction in public health expenditure of 
between $2.3 (95% CI: -4.85 to -0.30) and $5.3 (95% CI: -8.49 to -2.09) among countries with 
government effectiveness scores below the 10th percentile.  
Associations with health expenditure as a share of GDP were slightly less robust but in most 
specifications tariff reductions were only associated with a rise in public health expenditure as a 
share of GDP among countries among countries with a government effectiveness score above 
the 30th percentile, and a reduction among countries with scores below the 10th percentile (Figure 
S9).  Finally, results showing no association between tariff reductions, government effectiveness, 
and private health expenditure (measured per capita or as a share of GDP) were consistent in 
these alternative models (See Figure S7 and S8).  
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Informal labour market shares 
The size of the informal labour market might create challenges in levying taxes and collecting 
adequate revenue to finance public health spending (Auriol and Warlters, 2005; Lagomarsino et 
al., 2012). This suggests that tariff reductions may have divergent impacts on public health 
expenditure depending on the size of the informal labour market. Data pertaining to the size of 
the informal labour market is fragmentary. We were therefore unable to implement a full 
interaction test to asses variation in the association between tariff changes and government 
health spending according to the size of the informal economy in each country/ year. We 
nevertheless conducted a preliminary assessment by dividing countries according to whether the 
size of the informal sector is small or large, as follows. 
 
First, we obtained data from the International Labour Organization showing the share of 
informal employment as a percentage of total employment, 1999-2016 (ILOSTAT, 2018). Data 
availability in each year ranged from just 1 country in 1999 to 33 countries in 2013. Second, we 
calculated the mean size of the informal labour market across all countries in each year and 
converted each country-specific value into standardized z-scores. Where data were missing for a 
particular country and/or year, we used the most recent’ year’s data to calculate z-scores. Third, 
we converted these z-scores into 3 categories corresponding to informal labour market shares i) 
within 1 standard deviation from the mean (‘average informal labour market’), ii) at least one 
standard deviation larger than the mean (‘large informal labour market), and iii) at least 1 
standard deviation below the mean (‘small informal labour market). Finally, we re-estimated our 
interaction models replacing the ‘state capacity’ variable with the new ‘informal sector size’ 
variable to assess variation in the association between tariff reductions according to whether a 
country had a large or small informal labour market. We used this model to calculate the Average 
Marginal Effect of 1% tariff reduction on per capita health expenditure across countries with 
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small, average, and large informal labour market sizes. Figure 1 plots the results from this 
additional test.  
 
Figure 1. Average marginal effect of 1% tariff reduction on per capita health expenditure by informal labour 
market size 
 
Notes: Labour market sizes correspond to z-scores of informal labour market employment as a 
share of the total population in the most recent year when data were available, as follows. Large: 
at least 1 standard deviation above the mean. Average: within one standard deviation from the 
mean. Small: at least 1 standard deviation above the mean. 
 
The results in Figure 1 suggest that tariff reductions do not have divergent associations with 
public health expenditure depending on the size of the informal labour market as the AMEs are 
all comparable and the confidence intervals overlap substantially. Although these findings are 




Baseline tariff rate 
There is some evidence that reducing already low tariffs may not deliver large increases in 
growth (Dhingra et al., 2016). We might therefore expect countries with already-low tariffs to 
smaller increases in public health spending due to limited economic gains that provide resources 
for expanding health expenditure. Alternatively, as discussed in the main paper, many developing 
countries have difficulties in levying domestic taxes and have historically relied on trade taxes in 
order to finance public services (Cagé and Gadenne, 2018). Hence, the presence of low (or high) 
tariffs in a period before a tariff reduction may reflect the lack (or presence) of such difficulties. 
We therefore conducted an additional analysis to test whether the association between tariffs and 
public health spending depends on the tariff level in the previous year. The results are 
summarised in Figure 2 below.  
 




Figure 2 shows that the association between a 1% tariff reduction and public health spending 
was larger where tariffs were lower in the previous period. This suggests that where tariffs were 
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1. Appendix Tables 
Table S1. Data sources and measurement of variables in main analysis 
Variable Description Source 
Domestic general 
government (‘public’) 
health expenditure  
Public spending on health-care and services from 
domestic sources, measured in i) US dollars per 
capita, adjusted for inflation and differences in 






Spending on health-care and services from private 
sources, measured in i) US dollars per capita, 
adjusted for inflation and differences in purchasing 
power, and ii) as a share of GDP. Private sources 





Weighted mean tariff 
rate 
Weighted mean applied tariff as a percentage of the 
import value. This captures the average of 
effectively applied rates weighted by the product 






Product (GDP) per 
capita 
Gross Domestic Product, measured in US dollars 







Composite indicator of the perceptions of the 
quality of public services, civil service, policy 
formulation, implementation, and the credibility of 
the government's commitment to such policies. 
Measured as a percentile rank indicating the 
country's rank among all countries covered by the 
aggregate indicator, with 0 corresponding to lowest 









War dummy Dichotomous indicator coded as 1 in a country if 
there was an armed conflict resulting in 1000 or 







Table S2. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean or number 
(Standard deviation or %) 
Tariff rate, % 8·59 (4·78) 
Government health expenditure per capita, US dollars 227·53 (213·62) 
Private health expenditure per capita, US dollars 162.71 (170.52) 
WGI government effectiveness score, percentile rank 38·84 (20·49) 
GDP per capita, US dollars 6,188.40 (4,538.57) 
Official development assistance per capita, US dollars 69.65 (100.74)  




Notes: a: figure shows number of cases at war, all other figures are means. See Table S1 for list of 
data sources and variable measurement. See Table S4 for list of countries included in the analysis 
and number of years of data for each country. All US dollar figures adjust for inflation and 
differences in purchasing power.  
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Table S3. Data source and measurement for variables included in robustness checks 




Composite indicator of the perceptions of the 
extent to which a country's citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and 
a free media. Percentile rank indicates the country's 
rank among all countries covered by the aggregate 
indicator, with 0 corresponding to lowest rank, and 
100 to highest rank. 
World Governance 
Indicators 
Control of corruption 
score 
Composite indicator of the perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms 
of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by 
elites and private interests. Percentile rank indicates 
the country's rank among all countries covered by 
the aggregate indicator, with 0 corresponding to 
lowest rank, and 100 to highest rank. 
World Governance 
Indicators 
Polity score Index of regime authority measured on a 21-pont 
scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to 
+10 (consolidated democracy). The Polity score 
consists of six component measures that record key 
qualities of executive recruitment, constraints on 
executive authority and political competition. 
Center for Systemic 
Peace 
Population age  
structure 
Population between the ages 0 to 14 or over 65 as a 
percentage of the total population 
World Bank World 
Development 
Indicators 
Fertility rate The number of children that would be born to a 
woman if she were to live to the end of her 
childbearing years and bear children in accordance 
with age-specific fertility rates of the specified year. 
United Nations 
Population Division 
Urbanisation Urban population as a share of the total population World Bank World 
Development 
Indicators 
Political globalization Index capturing engagement in international 
political integration. It is measured using the 
number of multilateral treaties signed since 1945, 
the number of memberships in international 
organizations and a measure for the treaty partner 
diversity. The raw data are aggregated and countries 
are assigned a score of 1-100 based on the 






Simple mean applied tariff is the unweighted 
average of effectively applied rates for all products 
subject to tariffs calculated for all traded goods, 
measured as a percentage of the import value  





(MFN) tariff rate 
Average of Most Favoured Nation rates (applied to 
WTO members), weighted by the product import 
shares corresponding to each partner country 
World Bank World 
Development 
Indicators 
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Table S4. Countries included in analytical sample 
 Country No. years of data  
(% of all country-years) 
   Albania 14 (2.2) 
   Algeria 10 (1.6) 
   Angola 12 (1.9) 
   Bangladesh 13 (2.1) 
   Belize 13 (2.1) 
   Benin 10 (1.6) 
   Bhutan 5 (0.8) 
   Botswana 13 (2.1) 
   Brazil 14 (2.2) 
   Bulgaria 3 (0.5) 
   Burkina Faso 8 (1.3) 
   Burundi 13 (2.1) 
   Cabo Verde 8 (1.3) 
   Cameroon 12 (1.9) 
   Central African Republic 12 (1.9) 
   Chad 11 (1.7) 
   China 9 (1.4) 
   Colombia 11 (1.7) 
   Comoros 7 (1.1) 
   Costa Rica 16 (2.5) 
   Cote d'Ivoire 14 (2.2) 
   Ecuador 16 (2.5) 
   Egypt, Arab Rep. 11 (1.7) 
   Ethiopia 7 (1.1) 
   Gambia, The 8 (1.3) 
   Ghana 7 (1.1) 
   Grenada 10 (1.6) 
   Guatemala 13 (2.1) 
   Guinea-Bissau 8 (1.3) 
   Guyana 13 (2.1) 
   Indonesia 8 (1.3) 
   Jordan 13 (2.1) 
   Kenya 12 (1.9) 
   Kiribati 0 (0.0) 
   Lao PDR 8 (1.3) 
   Lesotho 2 (0.3) 
   Madagascar 16 (2.5) 
   Malawi 10 (1.6) 
   Malaysia 8 (1.3) 
   Mauritania 6 (0.9) 
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   Mauritius 11 (1.7) 
   Mexico 3 (0.5) 
   Mongolia 13 (2.1) 
   Morocco 7 (1.1) 
   Namibia 8 (1.3) 
   Niger 8 (1.3) 
   Nigeria 14 (2.2) 
   Pakistan 11 (1.7) 
   Papua New Guinea 10 (1.6) 
   Peru 13 (2.1) 
   Philippines 15 (2.4) 
   Rwanda 13 (2.1) 
   Senegal 14 (2.2) 
   Sierra Leone 5 (0.8) 
   Sri Lanka 4 (0.6) 
   St. Lucia 12 (1.9) 
   St. Vincent and the Grenadines 10 (1.6) 
   Sudan 8 (1.3) 
   Suriname 7 (1.1) 
   Thailand 6 (0.9) 
   Togo 1 (0.2) 
   Tonga 6 (0.9) 
   Tunisia 10 (1.6) 
   Vanuatu 3 (0.5) 
   Zambia 13 (2.1) 
   Zimbabwe 3 (0.5) 
Notes: Total number of countries: 65; total number of: 17. 
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2. Appendix Figures 









Figure S3. Association between country mean tariff rate and private health expenditure per capita and as 





Figure S4. Average marginal effect of 1% tariff reduction on government and private health expenditure as a 














Figure S6. Covariate balance in npCBGPS specifications 
 
Notes: npCBGPS weights are ‘non-parametric Covariate Balancing Propensity Score’ 
weights.(Fong, Hazlett and Imai, 2018) Mean absolute Pearson correlation of tariff covariates 
and predictions reduces from 0·20 to 0·0002 when applying npCBGPS weights. These are 
estimated using an algorithm that minimises the Pearson correlation between covariates and 
treatment assignment in the sample whilst simultaneously maximising the prediction of 
treatment assignment.  
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Figure S7. Alternative specifications: Average Marginal Effect (AME) of 1% tariff reduction on private health 
expenditure per capita, by government effectiveness score percentile 
 
Notes: Table S3 lists the data sources and measurement of variables included in robustness 
checks. Model 1 is a weighted fixed-effects regression model which includes the same controls as 
the main model and also re-weights country observations using non-parametric Covariate 
Balancing Generalised Propensity Score weight. Mean absolute Pearson correlation of tariff 
covariates and predictions reduces from 0·20 to 0·0002 when using npCBGPS weights; see 
Figure S6 for visualisation of covariate balance in npCBGPS specifications. Models 2-9 
include/exclude the listed variables as controls in the model. Model 10 uses the unweighted 
mean tariff as predictor rate rather than the import-weighted average tariff rate and Model 11 
uses the MFN, trade-weighted tariff rate. Model 12 lags all explanatory variables by one year to 
account for budget cycles. Model 13 adjusts for the growth rate in the previous year to reduce 
‘observer bias’. Model 14 excludes influential cases with Cook’s D larger than 4/n. Appendix S3 
describes each test in detail. 
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Figure S8. Alternative specifications: Average Marginal Effect (AME) of 1% tariff reduction on private health 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP, by government effectiveness score percentile 
 
Notes: Model 1 is a weighted fixed-effects regression model which includes the same controls as 
the main model and also re-weights country observations using non-parametric Covariate 
Balancing Generalised Propensity Score weight. Mean absolute Pearson correlation of tariff 
covariates and predictions reduces from 0.09 to 0.0008 when using npCBGPS weights; see 
Figure S6 for visualisation of covariate balance in npCBGPS specifications. Models 2-9 
include/exclude the listed variables as controls in the model. Model 10 uses the unweighted 
mean tariff as predictor rate rather than the import-weighted average tariff rate and Model 11 
uses the MFN, trade-weighted tariff rate. Model 12 lags all explanatory variables by one year to 
account for budget cycles. Model 13 adjusts for the growth rate in the previous year to reduce 
‘observer bias’. Model 14 excludes influential cases with Cook’s D larger than 4/n. Appendix S3 
describes each test in detail. 
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Figure S9. Alternative specifications: average marginal effect of 1% tariff reduction on public health expenditure 
as a percentage of GDP by government effectiveness score percentile 
 
Notes: Model 1 is a weighted fixed-effects regression model which includes the same controls as 
the main model and also re-weights country observations using non-parametric Covariate 
Balancing Generalised Propensity Score weight. Mean absolute Pearson correlation of tariff 
covariates and predictions reduces from 0.09 to 0.0008 when using npCBGPS weights; see 
Figure S6 for visualisation of covariate balance in npCBGPS specifications. Models 2-9 
include/exclude the listed variables as controls in the model. Model 10 uses the unweighted 
mean tariff as predictor rate rather than the import-weighted average tariff rate and Model 11 
uses the MFN, trade-weighted tariff rate. Model 12 lags all explanatory variables by one year to 
account for budget cycles. Model 13 adjusts for the growth rate in the previous year to reduce 
‘observer bias’. Model 14 excludes influential cases with Cook’s D larger than 4/n. Appendix S3 
describes each test in detail. 
 
